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Abstract
This companion paper suggests the potential benefits of applying Steven Lukes’ dimensions of power model to
the study of corruption in health systems. Lukes’ model sets out three “faces of power” classified by their 
influence on political discourse, resulting in overt, covert and latent discussion of issues depending on the 
degree of their alignment with the agenda of dominant power interests.
His concept that differential access to public discourse varies according to this alignment implies the potential 
for identifying more serious forms of corruption by the mismatch between their practical importance and the 
amount of open debate addressing them. These two variables are in practice inversely related, and do not, as 
might be expected, correlate, with more important topics receiving more public attention. Lukes’ model would 
predict and can explain such inversion of public priorities, which tells us that observed suppression of public 
debate might efficiently direct the interest of researchers and the efforts of those seeking to further the public 
good on to the key issues needing discussion and resolution. 
The commentary goes on to examine whether the most serious and dangerous forms of corruption might 
therefore also be the most invisible, and suggests that whistleblower reports should be considered a key data 
source for research into high-level corruption in health systems, including redirection of policy decisions away 
from those which are in the public interest.
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The accompanying paper1 on the topic of health system corruption, highlighting a striking knowledge gap and addressing multiple aspects of this criminality with 
a variety of practical examples. This present commentary 
will argue the centrality of the power dimension in dealing 
intelligently with corruption as a phenomenon.
Hutchinson, Balabanova, and McKee apply Kingdon’s 
policy streams model,2 and the Zyglidopoulos3 research 
framework which categorises by individuals, organizations 
and industries, countries, and cultural contexts. These 
are ways to classify incidents of corruption which can aid 
researchers in structuring their observations, but neither 
provides conceptual illumination of how corruption enters a 
system, perpetuates and expands itself, and defends against 
its own exposure in order to safeguard gains to its sponsors 
and organisers.
Lukes advances a framework for “the dimensions of 
power,”4 relating the exercise of power to the representation 
of issues in the public eye. He postulates an “overt” level 1, in 
which issues can be discussed openly in the public domain, 
a “covert” level 2, in which debate is hard to start and tends 
to exhibit major skews and blind spots, and finally a “latent” 
level 3, covering issues which remain permanently off the 
public agenda because their discussion threatens powerful 
interests. Lukes sought in this work to develop the previously 
dominant paradigm which opposed levels 1 and 2, the themes 
of public debate approved by the power source (which 
reach the “overt” agenda) versus the agendas raised by other 
interested groups which are excluded from or misrepresented 
in media discussion (limited to “covert” status by exclusion 
from the mainstream discourse). This exclusion results in 
underrepresentation of important problems on the public 
agenda. He wished to focus attention on further complexity 
in the situation, with the existence of a less detectable level of 
exercise of power acting to keep some important issues at the 
“latent” undiscussed level, so that the most contentious issues of 
all cannot be addressed and appropriate solutions formulated. 
Multiple mechanisms of action might contribute to achieving 
and maintaining latency of some memes, for example the 
deterrent effect of punishment and public opprobrium for 
those raising the issues, or the lack of developed conceptual 
frameworks to support the debate so that some forms of 
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dissatisfaction remain too hard to formulate in a coherent 
fashion at all, let alone to communicate successfully to others 
as a prelude to demanding public attention to the matter. 
Hutchinson et al note: 
“A view in some quarters that concerns about corruption 
divert attention from more important issues…. Some of 
those adopting this paradigm see a focus on corruption as 
a manifestation of the neoliberal attack on the state, noting 
how it was prioritized by development agencies in the 1980s 
during the Reagan-Thatcher era, when many public health 
systems were being dismantled.”1
 Lukes’ three-level framing implies that the more a type 
of corruption is discussed, the less significant it is. Here we 
observe that a focus on petty corruption by state officials 
appears to have been used by the neoliberal vanguard to 
provide distraction during the inception of a different form 
of corruption at much higher level: not pocketing small cash 
sums, but wholesale diversion of public budgets into the 
hands of large-scale commercial interests through national 
privatisation plans. 
Evidence shows that falling performance in national 
health outcomes accompanies advancing privatisation.5 For 
example, the following graph (see Figure) plots the cost of 
healthcare systems in high and middle-income countries 
against the lifespan of the populations they serve, using the 
the international dataset compiled by the Organisation for 
Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD). It shows 
how additional investment affects the health of the population 
differently in national public monopoly healthcare systems 
and in marketized and privatised healthcare systems.
We can see that for publicly funded healthcare systems, 
which are distributed around the green arrow to the left of the 
graph, putting in higher state funding tends to be statistically 
associated with higher lifespan in the general population. 
We can also see that these systems present excellent value for 
money in terms of the population level lifespans achieved.
In contrast, countries with more expensive national 
healthcare systems health systems (those from the centre to the 
right side of the graph) are those which have commenced the 
transition to a highly marketized model of care as exemplified 
by the US system (on the far right), which despite spending 
over $8000 per year per head of population, is associated with 
life expectancy lower than that of any other OECD country 
spending above $2200 per capita. In this group around the red 
arrow, the higher the per capita state funding, the poorer the 
outcome at population level. 
It would be fair to comment that such observational 
large-scale data sets may be vulnerable to confounding by 
unexplored factors, so the argument is strengthened by the 
fact that a plot of infant mortality data presents a very similar 
picture, though the confounders will be largely different. 
Here too, it can be observed that extra investment into non-
marketised public healthcare improves infant survival across 
the whole population, but extra investment into marketized 
and marketising public healthcare systems seems to reduce 
their success in terms of reducing infant mortality. 
There are multiple contributors to this apparently 
perverse result on the right-hand side of the graph. Critics 
of privatisation of national health systems usually focus on 
exclusion from care, and indeed we do see health outcomes at 
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population level in such systems depressed by the exclusion 
of a substantial proportion of the population from access to 
needed medical care. However, fewer are aware that for-profit 
health facilities tend to encourage overtreatment of affluent 
patients, which can also be harmful to health. In this case 
the extra money spent achieves no gains for the patients, 
rather harm to their health motivated by the opportunity to 
increase profits by creating patient demand for medically 
inappropriate care.
For those that are not excluded from care, changes from 
marketisation both incentivise and enable diversion of scarce 
public funds away from provision of effective healthcare 
and toward other applications, such as advertising budgets, 
replication of administrative functions in competing 
organisation, and dividends. Furthermore the running 
of a market within a national healthcare system to enable 
private provision itself absorbs a substantial proportion of a 
national health budget. Meanwhile the chance to make profits 
incentivises profit-related overtreatment, for instance as 
reported by the US Department of Justice, which has reached 
over seventy legal settlements with hospitals involved in 
implanting cardiac devices without medical justification in 
order to increase the income to these hospitals from the state 
Medicare scheme.6 Such behaviour not only wastes scarce 
funding but reduces healthcare performance at a population 
level. Thus the poor outcomes from marketized health systems 
result from a combination of complete or partial exclusion for 
some with the harms from profit-driven overtreatment for 
others.
Should healthcare privatisation ushered in under neoliberal 
arguments not thus be itself conceptualised as a form of 
active corruption? There is some evidence that the corrupting 
elements themselves do view privatisation that way. John 
Perkins, formerly employed as a marketer of privatisation 
schemes to African, Asian and South American governments, 
explicitly classifies the international neoliberal attack fronted 
by the World Bank, and IMF (the USA’s “Reaganomics” and 
Latin America’s “Thatcherismo”7) as corrupt and corrupting 
in his account of his own role “Confessions of an Economic 
Hit Man.”8 Likewise, in the interview of former IMF Chief 
Economist Joseph Stiglitz with investigative journalist Greg 
Palast, Stiglitz labels one of privatisation’s standard steps 
“briberization.”9
Petty corruption, such as under-the-counter personal 
payments to clinicians, is at the first “overt” level: it can 
be discussed explicitly and honestly, and indeed most 
of the discussion of corruption in healthcare focuses on 
these relatively trivial and inexpensive misbehaviours. In 
contrast, corruption at the highest level, as documented by 
Perkins and Palast, operates at Lukes’ “latent” level 3, where 
public discussion of the problem is rare despite its gravity, 
but the budgets raided can run into hundreds of billions 
of pounds. This blindness of the public discourse to all but 
trivial corruption squares with the striking lack of funding 
earmarked to research systemic corruption. In a rational and 
honest system, finding and cleaning up corruption would 
be prioritised, facilitated, and lavishly funded, because such 
savings have only benefits for service quality. 
Lukes’ concept can usefully be reverse-engineered: if 
researchers raise an issue of corruption and find that it is 
promptly addressed and rationally resolved, it is a level 1 issue, 
on the overt agenda. A level 2 issue is discussed but reframed; 
it may be addressed but never in a way likely to resolve it. 
Important issues which commentators find impossible to 
have publicly discussed at all despite their evident significance 
and urgency are thereby flagged up as level 3, held at the 
latent level by powerful vested interests. An example might 
be the lack of effective system-level action to block sales 
inducements to prescribers, as identified by Hutchison et al1: 
an organisational blind eye turned to such practices might 
suggest systemic corruption. Another is the minimal research 
attention so far paid to the fundamental professional conflict 
of interests of the insurance industry man heading National 
Health Service (NHS) England.10 A further sign attesting to 
behind-the-scenes suppression of open debate is the recent 
academic censorship debacle at the top of the Cochrane 
Collaboration.11
Perkins explains the sources and methods of the neoliberal 
infiltration from the perspective of one of its front-line 
salesmen. His search for a publisher demonstrated why and 
how the worst corruption stays hidden at the latent level, away 
from public debate: 
“In 2003, the president of a major publishing house that is 
owned by a powerful international corporation read a draft 
of what had now become Confessions of an Economic Hit 
Man. He described it as ‘a riveting story that needs to be told.’ 
Then he smiled sadly, shook his head, and told me that since 
the executives at world headquarters might object, he could 
not afford to risk publishing it.”6
Whistleblowers are a common consequence of hidden 
corruption, and their reports are among the best data sources 
concerning malfeasance at systems level. Doctors Holt,12 
Alexander, and Drew13 have written on the attempted silencing 
of clinicians who speak out for the protection of their patients:
“Francis found that the problem was widespread and 
systemic within the NHS: “I heard shocking accounts of the 
way some people have been treated when they have been 
brave enough to speak up … The number of people who 
wrote to the review who reported victimisation or fear of 
speaking up has no place in a well-run, humane and patient 
centred service.” He also found that the law is weak and does 
not protect whistleblowers, something campaigners have 
been reporting for some time” (Holt).
“…Raj Mattu, a whistleblowing cardiologist. An 
employment tribunal ruled last year that Mattu was 
‘blameless’ and unfairly sacked after voicing concerns about 
patient safety. An astonishing campaign was waged against 
Mattu: ‘Soon, the single complaint against Mattu had become 
35, then 200, ranging from questions over his qualifications 
to charges of serious criminal conduct outside work. These 
were sent to the GMC, CQC, the Strategic Health Authority 
and three different police forces; by 2009, all had been 
investigated and found to be false’” (Alexander and Drew).
If Lukes model does reflect the structuring of public 
discourse, then, logically, more attention should be paid to 
less-publicised aspects of public policy, especially to reading 
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whistleblower reports and to protecting their authors: 
these public-spirited individuals shed rare spotlights on 
matters which we cannot safely leave to be conducted in the 
shade. If solutions to the worst problems are not to be kept 
permanently from us, we must study them by paying attention 
to any whistleblowing from Lukes’ third level, in conflict 
with dominant power agendas and not for public discussion. 
Whistleblower reports may be the only chance we have to find 
out about frightening problems such as the risks to intensive 
care patients from chronic and extreme understaffing of 
available doctors, as raised by Dr. Christopher Day.14 Perhaps 
those studying public health agendas should pay special 
attention to this particular data source: is not that which is 
intentionally concealed bound to be also that which is likely 
to be of greatest interest?
Whistleblower disclosures could be used to monitor 
and change the system when needed, for example through 
legislation to prevent ‘legal’ corruption as is the instance of 
induced prescribing and handing contracts to private providers 
while there is a conflict of interest between them and policy-
makers. Occasionally such conflicts of interest do reach public 
attention, for instance those reported of Health Minister Matt 
Hancock in respect of Babylon’s GP-destabilising siphoning 
phone app,15 and of many of the House of Lords,16 but the 
discussion of such ideas is usually likely to have problems 
rising from the Level 2 agenda to Level 1, public debate, and 
this will require concerned people to promote public debate 
and discussion very actively. The Hutchinson et al paper is a 
welcome step in raising public attention to the problems of 
corruption in healthcare. It is to be hoped that this present 
commentary can encourage the adoption of Lukes’ three level 
framework to inform and structure future public debate on 
critical health issues, by focusing our attention not on the 
mainstream of public debate but instead directing it to those 
most-crucial matters which have been kept outside public 
awareness.
 
Ethical issues
Not applicable.
Competing interests
Author declares that she has no competing interests. 
Author’s contribution
LR is the single author of the paper. 
References
1. Hutchinson E, Balabanova D, McKee M. We need to talk 
about corruption in health systems. Int J Health Policy Manag. 
2018;8(4):191-194. doi:10.15171/ijhpm.2018.123 
2. Kingdon JW, Thurber JA. Agendas, Alternatives, and Public Policies. 
Boston: Little, Brown; 1984.
3. Zyglidopoulos S, Hirsch P, Martin de Holan P, Phillips N. 
Expanding Research on Corporate Corruption, Management, and 
Organizations. Los Angeles, CA: SAGE Publications; 2017. 
4. Lukes S. Power: A Radical View. London: Macmillan; 1974.
5. Reynolds L. The inconveniently excellent Beveridge NHS model: 
Part 1. Cost of Living website. https://www.cost-ofliving.net/the-
inconveniently-excellent-beveridge-nhs-model-made-redundant-
for-being-too-good/. Published Octtober 14, 2014.
6. Department of Justice, Office of Public Affairs. Nearly 500 Hospitals 
Pay United States More Than $250 Million to Resolve False Claims 
Act Allegations Related to Implantation of Cardiac Devices. United 
States Department of Justice; 2015.
7. Green D. Silent Revolution. Latin America Bureau/Cassell 1995 
pages 3, 51 & 75.
8. Perkins J. Confessions of An Economic Hit Man. Ebury Press; 
2005:ix-x.
9. Palast G. Sell the Lexus, burn the olive tree. In: The Best Democracy 
Money Can Buy. Robinson; 2003.
10. Optum increases dominance of NHS thanks to former employee 
Simon Stevens – now NHS commissioning quango boss. https://
calderdaleandkirklees999callforthenhs.wordpress.com/2019/04/24/
optum-increases-dominance-of-nhs-thanks-to-former-employee-
simon-stevens-now-nhs-commissioning-quango-boss/. Published 
April 24, 2019.
11. Hawkes N. Cochrane director’s expulsion results in four board 
members resigning. BMJ. 2018;362:k3945. doi:10.1136/bmj.k3945
12. Holt K. Whistleblowing in the NHS. BMJ. 2015;350:h2300. 
doi:10.1136/bmj.h2300
13. Alexander M, Drew D. Re: whistleblowing in the NHS. BMJ. https://
www.bmj.com/content/350/bmj.h2300/rr-3. Published August 5, 
2015.
14. Cooper B. I was left to fight alone for NHS whistleblowing protection. 
The Guardian. October 2, 2018. https://www.theguardian.com/
society/2018/oct/02/nhs-whistleblowing-protection-tribunal-junior-
doctors. 
15. Lind S. Labour Party complains to Prime Minister about Matt 
Hancock’s Babylon links. Pulse. November 3, 2018. http://www.
pulsetoday.co.uk/news/political-news/labour-party-complains-to-
prime-minister-about-matt-hancocks-babylon-links/20037889.
article. 
16. Social Investigations. Compilation of Parliamentary Financial 
Links to Private Healthcare. https://socialinvestigations.blogspot.
com/2014/03/compilation-of-parliamentary-financial.html. Published 
March 2, 2014.
